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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of bounty hunter misconduct catapulted into the
public spotlight in September, 1997, when a team of commando-like
criminals who claimed to be searching for a bail-jumper gunned down
a Phoenix couple in their own bedroom.1 Though the perpetrators'
story was later uncovered as a hoax,2 and though the men would
likely have been convicted of second-degree murder regardless of their
profession,s their case and others like it aroused impassioned de-
mands for bounty hunter regulation and, more radically,
constitutional restraints on the bail bond industry.4
Constitutional protections are applicable only against the
government and "state actors."r Bounty hunters have long been
recognized by the courts as private actors, and thus immune from
constitutional restraints. 6 Consequently, while bounty hunters do
enjoy police-like powers--courts have held that they may conduct
nonconsensual searches7 and use reasonable force in arresting defen-
dants-they are not restricted in their tactics in the same manner as
state agents. Specifically, they are free from the strictures of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, as well as the relevant sections
of the U.S. Code.9 Thus, bounty hunters may conduct warrantless
searches and arrests0 and pursue a defendant beyond state lines."
1. See Matt Kelley, Victims' Kin Denounce Lax Laws on Bounty Hunters, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 1997, at 7A.
2. It was later revealed that the gunmen posed as bounty hunters to rob the shooting vic-
tims. See Abraham Kwok, Students Learn How to Hunt Bail Jumpers, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 27, 1997, at D2.
3. See id. (reporting that the assailants in the Arizona incident were being tried for
second degree murder even before the true identity of the perpetrators was revealed).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty
Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 Hous. L. REv. 731, 739 (1996) (arguing
that bounty hunters play an extensive role in the criminal justice system and should therefore
be considered state actors subject to constitutional restraints); Emily Michael Stout, Bounty
Hunters as Evidence Gatherers: Should They Be Considered State Actors Under the Fourth
Amendment when Working with the Police?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 665, 689 (1997) (arguing that
bounty hunters should be subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions when working with police
to apprehend fugitives); Gregory Takacs, Tyranny on the Streets: Connecticut's Need for the
Regulation of Bounty Hunters, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 479, 526 (1994) (calling for increased
statutory regulation of bounty hunters).
5. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 370-71 (1872); Fitzpatrick v.
Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 41-42 (5th Cir. 1931); In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959, 960 (W.D. Pa. 1898).
7. See, e.g., People v. Houle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 874, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Nugent,
508 A.2d 728, 732 (Conn. 1986).
8. See State v. Everett, 530 So. 2d 615, 623 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a bondsman in possession of an arrest warrant is not a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
10. See, e.g., Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
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Scholars and pundits have reasoned that the expanding role of
bounty hunters in the American criminal justice system mandates the
imposition of constitutional standards on the bail bond industry. 2
They argue that the absence of such restrictions, particularly in light
of the state's conferral of "police powers" upon bounty hunters, is
patently illogical.'3 Underlying their cries for reform is the immutable
public perception that, without such safeguards, bounty hunters are
free to apprehend their prey at any cost.14
The truth, however, is that bounty hunters are not completely
unfettered by the law. To the contrary, the bail bond industry is
bound by the threat of criminal sanction,15 notions of reasonable
force, 16 and other principles of tort law.17 Indeed, very few bounty
hunters employ the kind of spectacular violence reported by the me-
dia.18 More typical is the use of psychological warfare-bounty hunt-
ers employing various forms of deception and seduction in the appre-
hension of fugitives. 9
11. See Taylor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 371-72; Lopez v. McCotter, 875 F.2d 273, 277 (10th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir. 1971).
12. See ag., Drimmer, supra note 4, at 758-63.
13. See iL at 764.
14. See, e.g., Donald Kaul, Outrageous Verdict in Polk County, DES MOINES REG. June 15,
1997, Opinion, at 3 (labeling jurisprudence governing bounty hunters as "open season on
immigrants"); Outlaw Bounty Hunters, AIz. DAILY STAR, Sept. 5, 1997, Comment, at 16A
(speculating that "there is nothing to stop the average Joe-or convicted felon-from calling
himself a bounty hunter and acting out his or her grade B movie fantasies"); Rein in the Bounty
Hunters Series: Editorials, ST. PETERSBURG TamES, Sept. 6, 1997, at 14A (erroneously claiming
that, under Florida law, bounty hunters are at all items free to use lethal force in apprehending
bail jumpers).
15. See, e.g., Stephen Hudak, County Goes After Bounty Hunters: Prosecutors Say
Pursuers Guilty of Crimes, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22, 1997, at 1B (referencing local case in which
a bounty hunter, after breaking into an innocent's home in search of a fugitive, pleaded no
contest to burglary); Kaul, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing a case in which a bounty hunter was
charged with burglary).
16. See Lopez, 875 F.2d at 277 (stating that bounty hunters could employ "reasonable
force' in arresting fugitives); State v. Nugent, 508 A.2d 728, 732 (Conn. 1986) (also applying a
"reasonable force" standard).
17. See McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 515 (D. Neb. 1965); Nugent, 508
A.2d at 734 (acknowledging that civil liability can arise when a bounty hunter exceeds the
bounds of his authority).
18. In the recent Arizona incident, the "bounty hunters" broke into the house with a
sledgehammer, then riddled the deceased with 29 gunshots. See Dermot Purgavie, He Came in
Search of Bounty (but ended up Behind Bars), OBSERVER, Sept. 28, 1997, at 5.
19. See Bounty Hunters: Why Do They Act Like Lawless Renegades?, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1997, at 10A (quoting a spokesman for the Ohio Attorney General's Office:
[mhe majority of people who make their living this way make their living in a professional
manner."); David M. Gross, Bounty Hunters Are Necessary for Bail Enforcement,
MINNEAPOUIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Sept. 13, 1997, at 21A (stating that "[tihe smart enforce-
ment agent uses stealth, seduction, trickery and surprise ... to make an apprehension, not
brute force... enforcement agents who are not smart don't survive in the business very long-
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Given these realities, this Note analyzes what steps, if any, are
appropriate for redressing the issue of bounty hunter misconduct. It
delineates the critical role bounty hunters and the bail bond industry
play in our judicial system, and suggests that bounty hunters are not
state actors subject to constitutional restraints. Further, it argues
that, even if bounty hunters were state actors, the strictures
contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments would not
deter bounty hunter misconduct. This Note concludes, therefore, that
states should legislate to control bounty hunter abuses with reference
to the constitutional structure that governs state police.
Part II provides a brief overview of the bail bond industry and
its place in our criminal justice system. Part HI addresses the recent
push to treat bounty hunters as state actors. Part IV discusses each
arm of modem state action doctrine. Part V applies that framework
to the bail bond industry and concludes that bounty hunters are, in-
deed, private actors. Part VI suggests that even if constitutional
restraints were applicable to the bail bond industry, the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments would not deter bounty hunter misconduct.
Lastly, Part VII proffers more effective, theoretically sound
approaches to bounty hunter reform.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BOUNTY HUNTER'S ROLE AND AUTHORITY IN THE
BAIL BOND PROCESS
A. The Bail Bond Process
Unless charged with a capital offense, a criminal defendant
who poses no serious threat to society is entitled to post bail.20 If the
defendant exercises this option, he is released from state custody
pending the outcome of his trial. Bail acts as surety for the defen-
Darwinism at work."); Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 27, 1997) (airing an
interview with Bob Burton, president of the National Institute of Bail Enforcement, who stated
that, while some "botched arrests" were inevitable, bounty hunters effected fewer of them than
public law enforcement agencies); Wayne Woolley, Bounty Hunters Have Unique Powers, More
Than Cops: They Have Wide Latitude in Arrests, Which Can Lead to Abuse, DETROIT NEWS,
Sept. 25, 1997, at A13 (quoting a veteran bounty hunter: "In 17 years of doing this, I think I've
kicked down maybe three doors."); see generally Sasha Abramsky, Citizen's Arrest, NEW YORK,
Jan. 5, 1998, at 32 (attributing the violent preconception of bounty hunters to popular television
programs).
20. See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 740.
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dant's appearance in court-the bail money is recoverable only if the
defendant is present for trial.21
Defendants without adequate personal resources may hire a
bail bondsman to post surety on their behalf.22 The bondsman files a
portion-usually ten percent-of the defendant's bail with the court.m
The bail money is returned to the bondsman if the defendant appears
at trial. However, if the defendant fails to appear at trial ("skips" or
"jumps" bail), the balance of the bail becomes due, and the bondsman
alone is liable.2
Nearly ten percent of criminal defendants who post bail skip,
exposing bail bondsmen to massive liability. 5 To recapture such
fugitives and retain economic viability, bondsmen contract privately
with bounty hunters, who seek out and return fugitives for a per-
centage of the outstanding bail (usually ten percent).26 Bounty hunt-
ers are paid by the bail bondsmen only after returning the fugitive
they have contracted to capture. 27
B. The Essential Function of Bounty Hunting in
American Criminal Justice
Bail-skipping is endemic to the American criminal justice
system. In 1994, the Justice Department reported that twenty-five
percent of felony defendants released on their own recognizance failed
to appear at trial; of these, eight percent were at-large a year after
arraignment.m Other studies suggest that half of all defendants
released prior to criminal proceedings have a history of skipping
bail.29 In New York alone, an estimated 35,000 people jump bail each
year.30 Not surprisingly, therefore, public law enforcement is ill-
21. See id. at 740-41.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 741-42.
24. See id.
25. See Stout, supra note 4, at 668.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Andrea Gerlin, On the Loose: Criminal Defendants Released Without Bail Spark a
Heated Debate, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1996, at Al. This problem is particularly rampant where
the bond posted is not financed with the defendant's own resources. Because commercial
bondsmen assume the financial risk of bail forfeiture, defendants who contract with them may
lack the incentive to appear at trial. See Caleb Foote, Note, Compelling Appearance in Court:
Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1062 (noting that bail-skipping
is more prevalent when a defendant's bond is financed by a commercial bondsman).
29. See Gerlin, supra note 28, at Al.
30. See Abramsky, supra note 19, at 37.
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equipped to retrieve all the fugitives that the criminal justice system
produces.31
Bounty hunters apprehend approximately 25,000 fugitives
within the United States each year.32  They return to custody over
ninety-nine percent of the criminal defendants who contract with
bondsmen and then skip bail.3 3  Given this efficiency and the state's
limited resources, the bail bond industry plays a critical role in our
judicial system. Without it, the state's ability to prosecute would be
impinged, the deterrent effect of legislation would be compromised,
and dangerous fugitives would remain at large indeterminately.3
Bondsmen would grow increasingly reluctant to post bail, and many
more innocent defendants would spend time languishing in already
overcrowded jails.
C. The Scope of the Bounty Hunter's Authority
Given the essential role bounty hunters play in the American
criminal justice system, courts have granted them wide latitude in
effecting their duties. Nicolls v. Ingersoll first outlined these broad
powers in 1810.35 Nicolls, a criminal defendant, had been released on
bail after enlisting the help of a commercial bondsman. After release,
Nicolls left the state, and the bail bondsman hired a bounty hunter to
return Nicolls to custody. The bounty hunter broke into Nicolls' home
at midnight and made the arrest.36
Reasoning that bounty hunters have broad authority to appre-
hend bail skippers, the court rejected the plaintiffs claims of trespass,
31. See, e.g., Gerlin, supra note 28, at Al (noting that "many locally run programs have
outgrown their capacity to assess and monitor defendants released under their auspices").
32. See Stout, supra note 4, at 670; see also Marc Gunther, Experts on Call: They're in the
Book and They Thrive on Public Attention, Cal. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1993, § 5, at 4 (reporting that, in
1992, bounty hunters made 30,000 arrests).
33. See Charles Oliver, National Issue, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, May 12, 1994, at 1. Also,
police are considerably less efficient at arresting defendants who haven't been committed to the
custody of a bail bondsman. See id, (reporting that police rearrest between 73 and 92 percent of
fugitives who have not contracted with commercial bondsmen); see also Abramsky, supra note
19, at 37 (noting that, of New York's 35,000 annual bail jumpers, the state-operated Warrant
Squad returns only 6,000-10,000).
34. See, e.g., Gerlin, supra note 28, at Al (noting that, according to Justice Department
statistics, 11 percent of bail skippers commit felonies while fleeing from the law); see also
Woolley, supra note 19, at A13 (quoting Matthew Maddock, president of the Michigan
Professional Bail Agents Association: "To take away the right of the bondsman to bring
somebody back to a judge-by the ear, if necessary-takes away a lot of the teeth of the criminal
justice system. It would be like taking away the right of a policeman to pursue a felon.")
35. Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
36. See id. at 146-47.
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assault, and false imprisonment. 7 In so doing, the court granted
bounty hunters the right to arrest fugitives at any time and in any
place.38 Moreover, the Nicolls court authorized bounty hunters to use
a degree of force in the process-for instance, the court held that
breaking down a fugitive's door would not necessarily trigger state
tort liability. 39
The United States Supreme Court expanded on Nicolls in
Taylor v. Taintor.40 There, the Court reasoned that a bondsman ac-
quired custody of a criminal defendant upon the consecration of a bail
contract. 41 This relationship vested bondsmen and their agents
(namely, bounty hunters) with broad powers of search and arrest over
their clients. Bounty hunters could pursue and extradite fugitives
across state boundaries, break and enter into a fugitive's home, and
use all necessary force in effecting an arrest.42
The broad powers outlined in Taylor remain the law today.
Bounty hunters may bring criminal defendants to jail at any time
after arraignment and use reasonable force in the process. 3
Moreover, courts have held that bail bondsmen and their agents are
private actors, and therefore free from constitutional restraints.44
Their searches and seizures need not be "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment;45 they are immune from the warrant require-
ment;" and they need not advise fugitives of their Miranda rights.47
37. See id at 153-54, 156.
38. See id at 156.
39. Id.
40. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872).
41. See id at 371.
42. See id. at 371-72.
43. See Theresa Walker, Thrill of the Chase Snares Posse of Bounty Hunters, SEAT=
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at All.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir. 1984) (insulating bounty
hunters from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment). But see Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d
426, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a bounty hunter working jointly with police to effect an
arrest could be constrained by the Fourth Amendment).
45. See, e.g., Rose, 731 F.2d at 1345.
46. See id.
47. See id. (stating that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable in bounty hunter cases).
1999]
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III. THE PUSH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
Recent editorials on the bail bond industry have demanded
bounty hunter reform.4 These editorials have suggested that
constitutional restraints offer the only logical solution to bounty
hunter misconduct.49
Scholars, too, have urged that bounty hunters-long consid-
ered private actors by the courts-be subject to the strictures of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.50 These writers argue that
Taylor is an antiquated decision.51 They note that, given the
proliferation of crime, the increased incidence of bail-skipping, and
the state's shrinking pool of resources, modern bounty hunters have
assumed a critical role in state law enforcement.2 This increased
responsibility, they conclude, is sufficient to establish state action.53
Underlying this position is the facially appealing, but deeply
flawed assumption that likes should be treated alike: that, because
bounty hunters perform police-like functions, they, like the police,
should adhere to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.54
Proponents of this approach rely heavily on the hysteria created by
the media's coverage of bounty hunter misconduct. They characterize
bounty hunters as lawless renegades and cite the severity of bounty
hunter abuse.55 Moreover, they suggest that only constitutional
restraints are sufficient to rebut the problems inherent in the bail
bond industry.56
As this Note will show, these arguments neglect judicial
precedent. A careful application of state action doctrine reveals that
constitutional restraints remain inapplicable to the bail bond
48. See, e.g., Bounty Hunters: Unfettered Danger, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1997, at B6
(calling for bounty hunter reform); A Throwback to the Wild West, HARTFoRD COURANT, Sept. 4,
1997, at A22 (same).
49. See, e.g., Kaul, supra note 14, at 3 (questioning why bounty hunters are not subject to
the same restrictions as police).
50. See, e.g., Drimmer, supra note 4, at 739 (arguing for constitutional restraints); Stout,
supra note 4, at 689 (same).
51. See Takacs, supra note 4, at 489 (stating that "it seems anachronistic that actions of
recapture in today's society are based on precedent over one hundred years old.").
52. See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 737-39 (noting states' increased reliance on commercial
bail bondsmen).
53. See id. at 739 (concluding that, because bondsmen and their agents play "integral
roles" in the criminal justice system, state action arises).
54. See id. at 764 (distinguishing bounty hunters from other private actors on the ground
that other private actors do not enjoy police-like powers of search and arrest).
55. See id. at 737-39 (noting bounty hunters' propensity for "habitual violence" and the
"social harms" which result).
56. See Drimmer, supra note 4, and Stout, supra note 4, neither of which discuss the
possibility of legislative reform.
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industry. Furthermore, even if they were applicable, the restrictions
posed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments would fail to deter
bounty hunter misconduct.
IV. STATE ACTION DocTRINE
A. Introduction
Constitutional constraints seek to limit governmental in-
fringement on individual liberties.57 In limited contexts, however, a
private actor can behave in ways that trigger restrictions normally
reserved for federal and state entities.58 The Supreme Court has
struggled to define what private activity lies within the sphere of
public-i.e., constitutionally proscribable-conduct. Generally, its
dispositions recognize four scenarios in which private behavior can
constitute state action:59 (1) privately-initiated, state-aided activity;60
(2) private assumption of a traditional state function;61 (3) state-
regulated private action;62 and (4) symbiotic relationships.63
Implicit in each of these theoretical strands is the notion that a
sufficient "nexus" must exist between the state and the private action
at issue before a finding of state action is possible. Jackson v.
57. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (recognizing that "most
rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments...
58. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (finding state action in the context
of a corporate-owned town).
59. See generally Thomas R. McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the Jackson Nexus
Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided Institutions, 31 VAND.
L. REV. 785 (1978). Note, also, that other strands of state action analysis have been proffered
and later abandoned by the Court. Chief among these is the "mere enforcement" theory
promulgated in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948). There, the Court found that
landowners were forced to act in a racially discriminatory manner by virtue of a state court's
ruling that upheld the enforceability of a racially-biased restrictive covenant. See id. at 20.
Central to the Court's holding was the idea that the court-ordered enforcement of a legal,
private contract constituted the requisite public participation for a finding of state action. See
id at 14-18. The fatal import of this rule is its inherent overbreadth: under the Shelley
analysis, any legal action undertaken by a private individual could be deemed state action so
long as it is challenged and upheld in state or federal court.
60. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,463-68 (1973) (holding that the state could not
lend textbooks to private schools engaging in racial discrimination).
61. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-10 (1946) (involving a corporate-owned town).
62. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42 (1982) (holding that a statutory self-help scheme that
required government aid gave rise to state action).
63. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961) (holding that a
coffee shop located inside a publicly-owned building was subject to Equal Protection claims).
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Metropolitan Edison Co. delineated this requirement, holding that, in
the context of a state regulatory scheme, state action will not arise
unless the state compels, requires, or coerces the challenged activity.64
Conversely, the state's failure to eradicate a privately established
practice will not give rise to state action.6 5 As a general proposition,
then, a. state's casual involvement will not establish the required
nexus between the government and the private action at issue.66
Beyond this general proposition, however, the jurisprudence on
state action offers little direction. The Court's holdings have been
inconsistent, confusing, and often nonsensical. The decision in
Jackson6s is demonstrative of this fact: If Jackson's proposition that
all mandatory government regulations give rise to state action is
correct, constitutional restraints would be imposed on anyone acting
in compliance with the law. Motorists, for example, would act as the
state when driving the speed limit. A pedestrian would subject
himself to constitutional restraints by using a crosswalk.
Since the Court could not have intended such an expansive
definition of public activity, another explanation must be sought. One
possibility is that the Court's state action decisions relate as much to
the social importance of the underlying claim as to any coherent
analytical theory. The Court may be more willing to impose
constitutional restraints on an activity which it feels threatens the
fabric of the national order. For instance, the most recent era of state
action expansion coincided with the civil rights movement and the
Court's commitment to racial equality.6 8 It is at least plausible that,
64. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974). In Jackson, a privately-
owned utility terminated a customer's electric service without notice. Id. at 347. The plaintiff
brought a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 347-48. The
Court held that, even though the utility was a government-regulated monopoly (the state had
approved termination procedures established by the utility), the company was not subject to
constitutional restraints. See id. at 358-59.
65. See id. at 357.
66 Though Jackson involved the state regulation of a private activity, "nexus" is
intuitively central to each strand of state action analysis. See generally McCoy, supra note 59,
at 817-22 (relating the nexus requirement to employee discharge cases). For example, in
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 508 (1976), the Court considered whether individuals had the
First Amendment right to picket within a privately-owned shopping center. In resolving the
issue of whether mall owners had usurped a traditional state function, the Court did not ask
whether a mall assumed state characteristics in the general sense. Rather, the key
determination was whether the state, in its maintenance of downtown shopping districts, had
traditionally furnished a venue in which individuals expressed political views. The Court,
therefore, required a Jackson nexus between the specific activity performed by the plaintiffs and
the traditional government function alleged. See id. at 513-21.
67. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
68. See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 726 (holding that a shop owner leasing space in a
government building had a symbiotic relationship with the state, and, therefore, could not
discriminate against black customers). In case after case following Burton, the Court rejected
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in adjudicating civil rights claims brought in the 1960s, the Court
used state action doctrine as a lever to effect a national policy of
nondiscrimination.
Also relevant to this Note's discussion is the modern Court's
general reluctance to find the nexus required to establish state action.
Soon after the equal rights explosion of the 1960s, the volume of
judicial dispositions finding state action began to evaporate. 69 For
instance, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court reversed its holding in
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., a
1968 decision asserting that privately-owned shopping malls were
functionally equivalent to a state enterprise. 7° Likewise, Jackson and
its progeny heightened the bar for state action claims involving
regulatory schemes.72 State aid cases evolved in a similar fashion.72
Other strands of the analysis, such as that proffered in Shelley v.
Kraemer, were left to atrophy.73
Thus, it is essential when analyzing the various strands of
state action theory to consider the subtext of Supreme Court deci-
sions. While the Court has enunciated some general principles, the
case law is largely incoherent unless viewed with respect to the
underlying claim and the general trend towards the enlargement of
the private sphere of activity.
the notion that contractual relationships between the government and private individuals
would, by themselves, give rise to state action. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
841 (1982) (stating that "[a]cts of... private contractors do not become acts of the government
by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts."). Yet,
absent the landlord/lessee relationship in Burton, it is difficult to see how the Court could have
ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Should we expect that the shop owner in Burton would have
remained a state actor, even if the government did not own the portion of the building in which
the shop was situated? Note, finally, that one of the few affirmations of the Burton rationale
occurred in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), a case involving race-based
peremptory challenges.
69. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosps., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973); Martin v.
Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1971). But see, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628
(1991) (reaffirming Burton's vitality by holding that race-based peremptory challenges by a
private attorney constituted state action).
70. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976) (reversing Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968))
71. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351; see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978)
(holding that the state statutory creation of a private warehouseman's lien on stored goods did
not require warehousemen to satisfy the lien, and thus did not satisfy the nexus requirement).
72. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (holding that, even though the
government was funding 90 percent of patients' care, physicians' decisions to transfer Medicaid
patients did not constitute state action); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840 (holding that a private
school that derives its income primarily from public sources is not necessarily a state actor).
73. See McCoy, supra note 59, at 792.
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B. Privately-Initiated, State-Aided Activity
Government aid to privately-initiated activity can give rise to
an inference of state action in limited contexts. 74 Generally, the
Supreme Court has intimated that the quality, rather than the vol-
ume of the aid, will determine whether constitutional restrictions
apply.75 In particular, state assistance that is imposed on private
bodies is likely to produce state action.7
6
The Court's holdings have indicated that even substantial
amounts of government aid will not necessarily yield state action.77
For example, in Blum v. Yaretsky, Medicaid patients challenged a
nursing home's recommendations for transfer on due process
grounds. 78 The Court refused to find state action even though the
government had subsidized ninety percent of the patients' health
care.
79
Therefore, the crucial determination in the state aid/state
action analysis is not the quantity of aid supplied by the government,
but rather the type of aid or its significance to the private activity. If,
for instance, a private body is required to receive aid (either by the
terms of a statute or by lack of meaningful choice), state action may
arise. 0 A hospital which remains economically viable due only to
government assistance provides a good example. Such an organiza-
tion, though privately owned, is likely to bend to state pressures to
ensure subsidization. Therefore, some of its actions could be charac-
terized as an extension of state policy, rather than the result of an
independent decision-making process. The "private action" in such
cases is actually the fruit of a coercive scheme of state aid-the hospi-
tal is more akin to the state than a private actor.8 1 Put another way,
74. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463-68 (1973) (holding that private
schools receiving textbooks on loan from the state could not maintain religious affiliations).
75. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011 (implicitly rejecting volume as a significant factor in
state aid/state action analysis).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 729 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that an
informant, acting outside the scope of instructions given by a federal agent, could not be consid-
ered a state actor).
77. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 101l.
78. Id.
79. See id. Again, this is probably a function of the fact that, intuitively if not
intentionally, the Court considered the nature of the underlying claim.
80. See, e.g., Bennett, 729 F.2d at 925 (holding that an informant must comply with state
instructions in order to trigger constitutional restraints); cf Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351, 357 (1974) (holding that a coercive nexus is required in state regulatory
cases).
81. State aid may also trigger constitutional restraints where it creates the public percep-
tion of state-generated action-i.e., a "symbiotic" relationship between the government and the
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when a regulatory regime irradicates-or at least severely im-
pinges-private initiative, the private actor functioning under the
regulatory regime assumes the will of the state. Under such circum-
stances, state action may result.
C. Private Assumption of a Traditional State Function
An individual is considered to act as the state when he exe-
cutes a function traditionally reserved for the government.8 2 The
scope of traditional state functions, however, has been interpreted
narrowly,8 and may be limited to the context of corporate towns.
The traditional state function strand of state action analysis
was first propounded in Marsh v. Alabama.84 There, a Jehovah's
Witness had been convicted of trespassing on the streets of a town
owned by a corporate enterprise. The Court reasoned that a pri-
vately-owned municipality was sufficiently analogous to a public town
to warrant state action. Therefore, Alabama was unable to prosecute
Marsh under the trespassing statute without implicating the First
Amendment.
Subsequent Court decisions have severely limited the import of
Marsh.s5 Recent Court dispositions involving shopping centers8 and
public utilities87 demonstrate that the Court refuses to expand public
function analysis beyond the context of privately-owned villages.88 In
particular, the Court will not find state action based on simple analo-
gies between private action and roles traditionally assumed by the
state. Rather, the Court has interpreted "traditional state function"
to require actual state involvement in the activity at issue, followed
by private usurpation of that function.8 9
private actor. See Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1987) (intimating that the
degree of aid received may inform a court's decisions regarding "symbiosis").
82. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1946) (holding that the usurpation of tra-
ditional state functions may give rise to state action).
83. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976).
84. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-10.
85. See, e.g., Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 512-21.
86. See id.; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
88. But see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (using the "public function"
rationale as an alternate theory on which to find that the maintenance of a city park constituted
state action).
89. See id. In Evans, the park at issue had been operated by the city government prior to
the incident giving rise to plaintiffs claim. Id at 297.
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D. State-Regulated, Private Action
State action may arise where the government regulates the
challenged activity. However, the state regulatory scheme must co-
erce, compel, or require the challenged activity to trigger
constitutional restrictions. 9°
The seminal state regulation/state action case is Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.91 There, the Court required a strict nexus
between the challenged activity and state legislation.92 Under the
Jackson standard, permissive legislation-i.e., that which allows for
private action-will not likely give rise to state action.93 However, the
Court in Jackson made clear that legislation which mandates private
behavior can trigger constitutional restraints.
Still, it is unclear which mandatory legislation suffices.
Because the Jackson holding presents no logical limitation on the
Court's ability to find state action in such contexts, the social
importance of the underlying claim and the Court's general reluctance
to enlarge the sphere of state action will likely inform the Court's
future decisions. 94
E. Symbiotic Relationship
Perhaps the most nebulous of all state action doctrines is that
governing "symbiotic" relationships between the government and
otherwise private actors. Under this theoretical strand, an individual
who partners or acts jointly with the state may, in limited contexts, be
subject to constitutional restraints.95
For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the
plaintiff brought an equal protection claim against a privately-owned
coffee shop which refused to serve African-American customers. 96 The
coffee shop had leased space in the bottom floor of a government-
90. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (holding that state approval of a utility's
termination procedures is insufficient to establish state action).
91. Id.
92. See id
93. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972) (holding a club's racial dis-
crimination was not state action simply by virtue of a state-conferred liquor license).
94. See supra Part IV.A
95. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961); Grijalua v.
Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that [glovernment action exists if
there is a symbiotic relationship with a high degree of interdependence between the public and
private parties"); Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that, where
private and public parties act as 'joint participants," state action may arise).
96. Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
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owned parking garage. The lease, however, contained no provision
banning discrimination. Moreover, the building derived only fifteen
percent of its funding from public sources. Even so, the Court held
that the shop owner's enterprise was inexorably intertwined with the
government and, therefore, the discrimination could be imputed to the
state.97
Unfortunately, Burton raises more questions than it answers.
It is unclear, for instance, what features will characterize a
"symbiotic" relationship between the state and a private actor.
Though the lessor/lessee relationship seems of pivotal importance in
Burton,98 other decisions reject the notion that contractual
relationships, alone, will trigger constitutional protections." Still,
Burton provided no evidence of an actual partnership between the
state and the private actor outside the terms of the lease.1°°
One interpretation of the Burton analysis is that "symbiotic"
relationships can arise through implied partnerships. By this reason-
ing, a court should ask whether the relationship between the state
and the private actor is such that an ordinary, reasonable citizen
would impute the challenged activity to the state. 0' Of course, the
salient shortcoming of this approach is its propensity for unpredict-
ability.10 2 However, the Court has been fairly consistent in its hold-
97. See id at 726.
98. Id. (holding that 'when a State leases public property... the proscriptions of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee.").
99. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (stating that "[aicts
of... private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or
even total engagement in performing public contracts."); Community Med. Ctr. v. Emergency
Med. Servs., 712 F.2d 878, 881 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Fletcher v. Florida, 858 F. Supp. 169, 171
(M.D. Fla. 1994) (same).
100. There was no evidence that the government compelled, coerced, or condoned the
challenged behavior. Rather, the state's inaction was sufficient to support the Court's holding.
See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
101. This formulation has some appeal, especially in view of the Court's approach to acci-
dental state aid in Establishment Clause cases. There, decisions have traditionally considered
factors such as the form of the government aid offered to religious institutions (e.g., tax exemp-
tions as opposed to hard goods), the identity of the recipient (e.g., parochial school vs. individual
student) and the location in which the aid is administered (e.g., on-campus vs. off-campus in a
parochial school context). See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, -, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2001-02
(1997) (summarizing the factors that inform the Court's decisions in Establishment Clause
cases). These factors are hardly probative of whether the state has rendered aid to a non-
secular organization. However, they speak volumes as to how the public perceives the govern-
ment's involvement.
102. Drawing again from the Establishment Clause analogy, it is interesting to note that
the Coures decisions in that context have been something short of consistent. Compare Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1977) (prohibiting the state from lending tape recorders to
parochial schools), with Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (allowing the loan of
books).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:171
ings restricting the application of the symbiotic relationship doc-
trine.03
The current Court's unwillingness to find symbiotic
relationships can be explained in one of two ways. First, the Court
may have recognized the unworkability of the Burton approach, and
thus abandoned it as it did Shelley v. Kraemer.1 4 Second, and more
likely, its failure to expand Burton may be symptomatic of a general
judicial trend towards reducing the sphere of state action.10 5
V. STATE ACTION IN THE BOUNTY HUNTER CoNTEXT
A. Introduction
For years, critics of the bail bond industry have lobbied to
restrict, if not altogether abolish, the practice of bounty hunting.1°6
Proponents of these measures rely on the now-familiar stories of
bounty hunter misconduct-anecdotes involving an unlicensed rene-
gade, himself a convicted felon, battering and humiliating an innocent
party.0 7 Such reports are, of course, appalling. However, they do not
necessarily demonstrate the need for constitutional restraints.
Even assuming rampant bounty hunter misconduct, a finding
of state action requires the application of principled legal standards.
103. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 542-47 (1987) (refusing to apply a Burton analysis to the U.S. Olympic Comm., which
selectively enforced its copyright in the word "Olympic" against the "Gay Olympic Games"). But
see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (holding that race-based
peremptory challenges trigger constitutional restraints, even though the state does not impose
the use of such challenges on litigants).
104. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
105. See McCoy, supra note 59, at 789-90 (noting the Court's shift towards conservative
state action findings). This explanation is particularly appealing in view of the Court's decision
in Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 614. There, the Court held that litigants making race-based
peremptory challenges could be subjected to constitutional restraints. See id. at 628. Given the
lack of state involvement (the decision to make such challenges originates with the attorney),
the Court's decision seems rooted in the public perception that litigants, as participants in the
judicial process, are somehow extensions of the state itself. It is possible that Edmonson is a
narrow ruling, applicable only to procedural devices used in judicial proceedings. Moreover, the
Court likely gave weight to the nature of the underlying claim in reaching its decision. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, Edmonson signifies the vitality of Burton.
106. See, e.g., Bounty Hunters are Lethal Throwback to Frontier Justice, PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington, Ill.), Sept. 12, 1997, at A14 (calling bounty hunter licensing and training require-
ments "timid at best"); Art Sanera, Don't Regulate Bounty Hunters-Eliminate Them, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 12, 1997, at B4 ("We don't need them licensed or regulated-we need them
eliminated!").
107. See, e.g., Kaul, supra note 14, at 3 (describing a case in which two bounty hunters
broke into a home, handcuffed its occupant and conducted a fruitless search of the premises).
186
BOUNTYHUNTER MISCONDUCT
Framed in this manner, precedent and jurisprudential trends suggest
that bounty hunters are not state actors.
B. Privately-Initiated, State-Aided Activity
In the course of apprehending a fugitive, bounty hunters some-
times enlist the aid of police officers. 08 Generally speaking, this
assistance does not create a presumption of state action unless the
police require a bounty hunter to comply with a state instruction, or
the aid is significant enough to create the inference of a "symbiotic
relationship."
Courts have repeatedly held that bounty hunters receiving de
minimis aid from the state are not necessarily exposed to
constitutional restraints. For instance, in United States v. Rhodes, a
bounty hunter received information from police officers in order to
ascertain the whereabouts of a bail jumper.109 Reasoning that state
action was not present because the bounty hunter received no
remuneration from the government and the state issued no specific
instructions regarding how to apprehend the fugitive,10 the court held
that the state assistance failed to produce state action."'
The facts in Rhodes are typical of fugitive apprehension in that
bounty hunters rarely receive financial compensation or instructional
guidance from state enforcement agencies."2 Traditionally, bounty
hunters contract privately with bonding agents."3 These bondsmen
offer the bounty hunter a percentage of the outstanding bail in return
for rearresting the fugitive."4 The state, therefore, is not usually
involved in the bounty hunter's remuneration. Furthermore, police
rarely have the time to offer instructions regarding the apprehension
of particular fugitives. It is precisely due to a dearth of resources and
an inability to track bail jumpers that police rely on bounty hunters." 5
108. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 428-30 (4th Cir. 1987) (involving a police
officer who physically assisted a bounty hunter in making an arrest).
109. United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 467 (9th Cir. 1983).
110 See id
111. See iti
112. See Abramsky, supra note 19, at 35 (discussing Arizona's push to require bounty
hunters to notify local police of busts); Woolley, supra note 19, at A13 (noting that there are
"occasions when local law enforcement [is not] aware of someone being picked up for skipping
bail.").
113. See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 743.
114. See id.
115. See Woolley, supra note 19, at A13 (noting that bounty hunters provide a valuable
service to overworked police departments).
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Of course, the exceptional case does arise. For instance, in
Jackson v. Pantazes, a police officer physically assisted a bounty
hunter in making an arrest.116 The Fourth Circuit held that when
working jointly with public law enforcement in such a manner, bounty
hunters are state actors.1 7
The Pantazes holding is questionable in light of the nexus re-
quirement outlined in Jackson and its progeny."8 These cases hold
that state aid which does not compel individual action is not sufficient
to trigger constitutional restraints. For example, in United States v.
Bennett, an informant entered a suspect's bedroom without consent
and took incriminating photographs of a sawed-off shotgun."9 The
court reasoned that, because the informant's actions contravened
specific instructions given by federal agents, the informant had not
acted as an instrument of the state when taking the photographs.m°
In other words, since the government had not specifically compelled
the informant's actions, the nexus between the state and the
challenged activity could not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.
Likewise, as the government did not compel the bounty hunter's
misconduct in Jackson v. Pantazes, the police officer's assistance was
an insufficient proxy for state action.
Jackson v. Pantazes may be understood, if at all, by the poten-
tial "symbiotic relationship" between the government and its infor-
mant. That is, given the existence of "joint" activity (and, perhaps, a
significant degree of government aid), the court may have reasoned
that the state had inexorably insinuated itself into the challenged
activity, thus producing state action.'2'
116. Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1987). The officer accompanied the bounty
hunter inside the suspect's home and physically restrained the suspect during the arrest.
Additionally, the officer gave the bounty hunter advice as to how to effectuate the arrest. See id
at 428-30.
. 117. See id. (holding that, because a public officer assisted physically in the plaintiffs
apprehension, the bounty hunter could be considered a state actor for purposes of§ 1983).
118. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
119. United States v Bennett, 729 F.2d 923, 924 (2nd Cir. 1984).
120. See id.
121. See Pantazes, 810 F.2d at 430. For a more detailed discussion of "symbiotic
relationship" in the bounty hunter context, see infra Part V.E.
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C. Private Assumption of a Traditional State Function
Bounty hunting-as distinct from state police work-is not a
state-generated enterprise. Rather, it is the product of a market
economy. The phenomenon of bounty hunting arose from the unique
vulnerabilities of bondsmen: As the commercial bail bond industry
grew, it became impossible for bondsmen to apprehend each fugitive
personally.122 To recoup bonds and maintain economic viability, bail
bondsmen enlisted the aid of professional manhunters.n3
If bounty hunting satisfies the "traditional state function"
strand of state action analysis, then "traditional state function" re-
quires neither "tradition" nor "state function." In short, such an ap-
proach suggests that action which merely resembles a duty normally
assumed by the government triggers constitutional restraints. This
reasoning is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, it is incon-
sistent with judicial precedent. Supreme Court cases suggest that
"public function" will not yield state action unless the private actor
has usurped a duty actually performed by the state. The Court has
gone so far as to require that qualifying activities be "exclusively re-
served to the state."124 "Traditional," then, is synonymous with
"exclusive" for purposes of public function analysis. By this definition,
an activity which has been privately initiated from its inception (e.g.,
bounty hunting) is categorically precluded from the sphere of
"traditional state function."'m
Second, if a "traditional state function" can arise through anal-
ogy, courts are without logical guidelines with which to assess the
parameters of state action. For instance, if bounty hunting "smells"
like police work, why not extend constitutional restraints to shopping
mall security guards or doormen in private apartment buildings? The
broad power of analogy could create a dangerous slippery slope,
trammeling the primary function of the Bill of Rights (i.e., preventing
122. See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 750 ('[Als the growing nation's frontiers broadened and
its citizenry came to lack deep communal roots, so grew the risk that a bondsman who failed to
monitor his principal's movements would lose his security. [Therefore,] [blondsmen often hired
bounty hunters to locate and retrieve defendants to ensure their proper appearance at trial.").
123. See id.
124. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (emphasis added).
125. In contrast, the Court has consistently held that private usurpation of an activity that
has actually been performed by the state can constitute state action. For example, in Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966), the Court held that the trustees of a private park could be
state actors where the state had previously maintained the same park as a public facility.
Likewise, in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473-77 (1953), state action existed where the
government delegated electoral tasks to a private political association.
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the state from interfering with individual liberties secured by the
Constitution).
D. State-Regulated, Private Action
In an attempt to pacify public outrage and curtail misconduct
in the bail bond industry, a few states have enacted regulations aimed
specifically towards bounty hunters. Under the Jackson analysis,
however, such regulatory schemes are unlikely to produce state action
unless they compel or require the activity at issue.2 6
To date, the effort to regulate bounty hunters has been regret-
tably lax. As of September 1997, only six states mandated bounty
hunter licensing.127 Many states have no regulations.m Furthermore,
Congress has not acted to curtail the broad rights conferred on bounty
hunters by the Supreme Court.129 Therefore, the degree of state
involvement in the bail bond industry is generally de minimis, and,
logically, unlikely to create state action.
Moreover, the regulations which do exist do not compel or
require bounty hunters to act in contravention of constitutional prin-
ciples. For example, Florida's state code requires bounty hunters to
obtain a license from the state.180 Such licenses are not issued unless
the applicant receives twenty hours of training, undergoes a back-
ground check, and submits fingerprints to the government.'
3'
Requirements like those outlined in the Florida statute do not
satisfy the nexus required to establish state action in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison.132 The state has not required, compelled, or
coerced the bounty hunter to seek fugitives, or to commit tortious acts
against innocent third parties. Thus, the activity challenged in
bounty hunter misconduct cases cannot fairly be attributed to the
government under this strand of state action analysis.
126. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
127. See Jonathan Drimmer, America's Least Wanted: We Need New Rules to Stop Abuses,
WASH. POST, Sept. 21 1997, at C6.
128. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 7A (citing the lack of regulation across the nation);
Purgavie, supra note 18, at 5 (lamenting the absence of bounty hunter legislation in Arizona).
129. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366,371 (1872). Taylor states as follows:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his
sureties.... Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in
their discharge .... They may pursue him into another state; may arrest him on the
Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose.
130. See Drimmer, supra note 127, at C6.
131. See id.




For those advocating constitutional restraints on the bail bond
industry, the "symbiotic relationship" strand of state action analysis
offers a persuasive argument.33 Given the Court's narrow application
of this doctrine and the absence of supportive precedent, however,
"symbiosis" is not likely to impact the bail bond industry.
While the theoretical underpinnings of "symbiosis" doctrine are
vague, 1' 4 it appears clear that the "joint" action referred to in various
cases 13 5 does not require actual state involvement. Rather, the chal-
lenged activity need only create the appearance of joint activity. 36 A
symbiotic relationship, therefore, is formed by the confluence of vari-
ous factors influencing the public's perception of the challenged ac-
tion. If the activity appears inexorably linked with the government,
constitutional restraints will apply; if not, a claim of state action will
fail.
No case has held that a bounty hunter's individual action to
apprehend a fugitive creates a symbiotic relationship with the state.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., however, the Court did hold
that "joint" action involving the judiciary may give rise to state
action.'37 In Edmonson, litigants making race-based peremptory
challenges were subject to the restraints of equal protection.38
The facts of Edmonson, however, are easily distinguishable
from the typical case of an abusive bounty hunter. Most importantly,
bounty hunters are significantly more removed from the judicial proc-
ess than courtroom attorneys. The bounty hunters' activity takes
place in the field and is not enmeshed with a court's procedural rules.
Indeed, bounty hunters are commonly viewed as lonesome mavericks,
operating outside the reach of the law.139 The public's perception,
therefore, is not that bounty hunters act "jointly" with the state, but
that they operate without any semblance of state guidance.
133. See, e.g., Drimmer, supra note 4, at 784 (arguing that bounty hunters maintain a
symbiotic relationship with the state).
134. See supra Part IV.E.
135. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[Elven in the
absence of any state statute, custom or policy which authorizes the private party's conduct...
joint activity, alone, is sufficient.").
136. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (emphasizing that
the state had "insinuated" itself into the challenged activity) (emphasis added).
137. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
138. Id.
139. See Bounty Hunters: A Wild West Tradition Worth Scrapping, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
STAR-TRm., Sept. 8, 1997, at 10A (characterizing bounty hunting as an "anarchic" profession).
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A different case arises where bounty hunters act closely with
police in making an arrest.140 As in Jackson v. Pantazes,'4' the line
between state and private activity is blurred where public law en-
forcement physically assists in the apprehension process, or where
police devise a plan for capture that the bounty hunter faithfully
executes. However, as discussed earlier,142 these scenarios rarely
arise in the real world, and, therefore, do not give rise to the sweeping
conclusion that bounty hunters, in general, maintain a symbiotic
relationship with the state.
More generally, "symbiosis" theory has been narrowly applied
by the Court in the years following Burton.'43 There is no clear reason
for this trend to reverse itself with respect to the bail bond industry.
Of course, an unpredictable factor in the equation is the Court's
interest in the underlying claim of bounty hunter misconduct. Given
the crush of media attention this topic has received in recent
months, 44 a court's decision on this issue might buckle under social
and political pressure. 45
Outside the rubric of race relations, however, the Court has
declined to stretch the bounds of state action doctrine. 46 Moreover,
given the rare occurrence of bounty hunter misconduct 47 and its
general insignificance to the national order,1 it is unlikely that the
Court would depart from its normal course for the purpose of
regulating the bail bond industry. By the same reasoning, the Court
may be more likely to find state action if the bounty hunter's
violations involved discrimination against minority suspects. 49 But
again, this is hardly justification for the blanket proposition that
bounty hunters are, categorically, state actors.
140. See, e.g., Pantazes, 810 F.2d at 428-30.
141. Id.
142. See supra Part V.B.
143. See McCoy, supra note 59, at 789-90.
144. See sources cited supra notes 14 and 19.
145. Cf supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's state action holdings
in the Equal Rights context).
146. See generally sources cited supra note 68; Frederick G. Antown, Jr., Note, State
Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the State/Private Distinction, 2 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 722 (1975);
David S. Elkind, Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974); see also supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
147. See Abramsky, supra note 19, at 35; Woolley, supra note 19, at A13.
148. Despite a handful of highly politicized episodes, the incidence of bounty hunter
misconduct is decidedly low. See Abramsky, supra note 19, at 35 (reporting that, of the nearly
23,000 busts made by bounty hunters in 1996, less than two dozen resulted in complaints of
misconduct).
149. See Kaul, supra note 14, at 3 (asserting that racial minorities fall victim to bounty
hunter abuse in disproportionate numbers).
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VI. THE DEFICIENCY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS: 15o
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS WILL NOT DETER
BOUNTY HUNTER MISCONDUCT
The primary limits on police conduct are detailed in the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment guar-
antees an individual's right to be free from "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. 151 The Fifth ensures a criminal defendant's right
against self-incrimination. 52 The Sixth Amendment guards an ac-
cused's right to an attorney after commencement of judicial proceed-
ings.1583
When these rights are violated, a court may remedy the
injustice by application of the exclusionary rule. That is, it may, at its
discretion, exclude evidence produced as a result of the constitutional
violation.'5 The exclusionary rule is justified on two grounds: deter-
rence of future misconduct and judicial integrity.15 However, because
150. If judged as state actors, bounty hunters might also fall under the reach of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 242, and 1983 (1994). Under Lugar v. Ednonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982), a
party is vulnerable to such claims if he functions as a state actor and acts under the color of
state law. While this legislation would certainly govern many of the abuses committed by
bounty hunters, it is unlikely that it would reach beyond the scope of existing state tort and
criminal law.
Section 1983 would open bounty hunters to civil damages for committing Fourth, Fifth, or
Sixth Amendment violations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (creating a tort claim for the violation of
constitutional rights). However, given the range of state tort claims to which bounty hunters
are already susceptible, it is unlikely that § 1983 does anything more than duplicate common
law liability. If, for instance, a bounty hunter breaks into the home of an innocent party, § 1983
creates liability for an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Absent § 1983,
however, the bounty hunter is still open to the state tort claims of trespass, invasion of privacy,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Similarly, §§ 241 and 242 create federal criminal prohibitions against civil rights violations.
42 U.S.C. §§ 241-42. However, bounty hunters are already bound in all significant ways by
state criminal codes. For example, f the bounty hunter beats a fugitive who is not resisting
arrest, the state can already prosecute the boundy hunter under criminal statutes governing
assault and battery.
Note, however, that where bounty hunter misconduct can be tied to a discriminatory
animus, §§ 241, 242, and 1983 may reach crimes not contemplated by state law. These provi-
sions of the U.S. Code were passed precisely because state legislation did not adequately provide
for racial equality. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (discussion of legislative purpose). Thus, a
bigoted bounty hunter may well escape state sanction, but incur liability under the U.S. Code.
151. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement does not mandate a "knock and announce" rule).
152. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-66 (1966) (detailing the history and
importance of the Fifth Amendment privilege).
153. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams (Williams 1), 430 U.S. 387,401 (1977) (holding that, after
arraignment, police could not question a defendant outside the presence of his attorney).
154. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (noting that "unbending
application of the exclusionary sanction... would impede... [the] functions of judge and
jury.").
155. See, e.g., id. at 918-21 & n.22.
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the judicial integrity rationale has rarely surfaced in the Supreme
Court's dispositions, deterrence is recognized as the rule's primary
theoretical basis. 156
The exclusionary rule, therefore, would find application in
bounty hunter cases only if it had a deterrent effect on future miscon-
duct. Such an effect is unlikely. Bounty hunters' incentives are not
related to the ultimate conviction of the defendant; professional
manhunters need only return a fugitive to custody in order to secure a
portion of the outstanding bond. Since a court's decision to exclude
evidence would not affect this remuneration, the exclusionary rule
would not likely influence the bounty hunter's behavior in the field.
Even if the exclusionary rule had a deterrent effect, it would,
nonetheless, do little to remedy injuries caused by bounty hunter
misconduct. The bounty hunter is not an evidence gatherer in the
same sense as police. He is not an active participant in the
investigatory process; rather, the bounty hunter is engaged solely in
the business of arrest. Thus, any deterrent effect created by the
exclusionary rule is mitigated by the fact that bounty hunters
generally produce very little evidence to exclude.
Some have argued that bounty hunters have an incentive to
gather evidence simply because police are more likely to assist bounty
hunters who obtain evidence than those who do not.157 However, this
reasoning is based on the erroneous assumption that police have the
luxury of favoring one fugitive recovery agent over another. Given the
realities of law enforcement and the critical lack of resources avail-
able to fight crime, it is unlikely that police would dissuade anyone
willing to assist in the fugitive recovery process. 58 The need to
recover the defendant outweighs the need to secure additional
evidence-encouraging investigation at the expense of securing ar-
rests is like placing the cart before the horse.
156. See, e.g., Stone v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976) (noting that judicial integrity
plays a limited role in determining whether the exclusionary rule applies in specific cases).
157. See Stout, supra note 4, at 688.





Given the improbability of state action in bounty hunter cases
and the lack of meaningful proscriptions found in the Constitution
and the U.S. Code, bounty hunter regulation is best undertaken by
the states themselves. The advantages of legislative (as opposed to
federal constitutional) remedies have long been recognized by judges
and scholars. 159 Legislation allows discrete geographical regions to
initiate solutions specific to their particular needs. In the process, it
encourages experimentation, trial and error, and the ultimate
distillation of the optimal approach to the issue at hand.
In the case of bounty hunter misconduct, the advantages of a
legislative approach are compounded by the inapplicability and ineffi-
cacy of constitutional restraints. Not only are bounty hunters private
actors, and thus immune from the strictures of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments, but, even if these proscriptions were applicable,
they would not effectively deter or remedy bounty hunter misconduct.
Sensing this conundrum, a growing number of states have
enacted laws regulating the bail bond industry. These steps are laud-
able. However, legislatures should be wary that adequate regulation
will require a multi-layered approach.
B. Licensing Requirements
First, and most critically, legislation should restrict entry into
the profession of bounty hunting. As with any skilled labor, minimum
requirements ensure competency and reduce the incidence of mistake
and misconduct in the field. *More importantly, and unlike
constitutional measures, threshold criteria are proactive. Such regu-
lations do more than redress bounty hunter misconduct; they prevent
it.
Nevertheless, only a handful of states have enacted laws re-
quiring bounty hunters to obtain licenses. 60 Among these, Nevada's
159. Courts, for instance, will avoid constitutional issues if it is possible to resolve a case on
other grounds. Moreover, federalist values dictate that governing power should vest in the
states whenever possible. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (stating
that "[t]he powers of the general government.., are delegated by the states... and must be
exercised in subordination to the states, who alone possess supreme dominion.").
160. See Drimmer, supra note 127, at C6.
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approach is the most comprehensive. There, felons and individuals
under twenty-one years of age are categorically prohibited from
chasing fugitives.'6 ' Moreover, an applicant can not obtain a license
unless he passes a drug screen, obtains eighty hours of training, and
undergoes a psychological evaluation.162
Nevada's approach effectively precludes most psychologically
unstable, criminally inclined, immature, and incompetent individuals
from becoming bounty hunters. However, it lacks a mechanism by
which the state can detect an applicant's dormant problems. 163 If a
legislative scheme is to encompass every precaution possible, follow-
up evaluations of licensed bounty hunters should be required at two-
or three-year intervals. This procedure would reveal criminal pro-
clivities, psychological imbalances, and other incompetencies that
arise after the date a license is issued. When combined with an ag-
gressive screening policy for first-time applicants, it ensures that the
pool of licensed bounty hunters is consistently sterile.
C. Regulations Governing Bounty Hunters in the Field
Licensing requirements alone will likely be insufficient in
addressing the issue of bounty hunter misconduct. Even the most
qualified professionals are likely to commit tortious-and even crimi-
nal-acts if not properly regulated in the field. Bounty hunters,
therefore, must face some restrictions in the administration of their
duties.
Such restraints already exist in the form of state tort and
criminal law. For example, a bounty hunter who oversteps the
bounds of "reasonable force" may subject himself to claims of assault,
battery, wrongful death, manslaughter, or murder.'6 Nevertheless,
anecdotal evidence suggests that, at least some of the time, estab-
lished rules have failed to dissuade bounty hunter misconduct. 65
While sporadic acts of noncompliance with the law are inevitable,
161. See Purgavie, supra note 18, at 5.
162. See id
163. The Nevada statute does require bounty hunters to renew their licenses every three
years. See 19 NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 697.230 (Michie 1998). However, the Nevada scheme
provides no mechanism by which to judge whether renewal applicants have fallen below the
threshold criteria. Rather, such applicants are required merely to submit a fee and written
request for renewal to the state commissioner. See id.
164. See, e.g., Kwok, supra note 2, at D2 (noting that, in the recent Arizona case, the
assailants were initially charged with second-degree murder).




further regulation of bounty hunter conduct may reduce the incidence
of claims against bail bondsmen and their agents.
A few states have already taken steps in this regard. Illinois,
Wisconsin, Oregon, and Kentucky proscribe extradition of fugitives by
out-of-state bounty hunters without judicial permission.166 At least
one other state--Minnesota-prohibits bounty hunters from breaking
into homes of third parties in order to catch criminal defendants in
misdemeanor cases. 167 On the federal level, Senator Robert Torricelli
has introduced legislation which would impose a "knock and an-
nounce" requirement on fugitive recovery agents. 168
These measures constrain a bounty hunter's discretion in the
field without unduly sacrificing the efficacy and safety of the fugitive
recovery process. Other regulation would be equally constructive.
States could require that bounty hunters obtain warrants before
effecting searches and arrests within the home. Legislatures might
also prevent bounty hunters from using particular firearms. 69
Significantly, such measures would impose constitutional-like
restraints on the bail bond industry without implicating the issue of
state action. Moreover, because legislatures can prescribe penalties
for non-compliance, these statutes would pack the deterrent force
lacking in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 70
However, care should be taken not to overregulate bounty
hunters in the field. Like police work, bounty hunting is a profession
characterized by split-second decision making and extraordinary
danger to personal safety.'7, Bounty hunters endure enormous risk to
life and limb in providing a substantial benefit to society. Therefore,
bounty hunters should enjoy special privileges over and above those
conferred upon the average citizen. At the very least, bail bondsmen
and their agents are entitled to the same discretion as state law
enforcement officers.
Indeed, the constitutional scheme governing police represents
years of judicial thought, and, hypothetically, the optimal balance
166. See Woolley, supra note 19, at A13.
167. See Bounty Hunters: A Wild West Tradition Worth Scrapping, supra note 139, at 10A.
168. See Purgavie, supra note 18, at 5.
169. See id. (quoting experts who advocate a complete ban on firearms in the practice of
commercial fugitive recovery).
170. See Stout, supra note 4, at 688 (recognizing that the exclusionary rule does not dis-
suade bounty hunters from violating fugitives' constitutional rights).
171. See, e.g., George Coryell, The Bounty Hunter: It's His Money at Stake When a Suspect
Skips on Bond, and the Law Says Robert Hallback Can Do What it Takes to Protect his Interests,
TAMPA TIa., Aug. 14, 1995, at 1 (describing an incident in which a bounty hunter was shot
while pursuing a fugitive).
1999] 197
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
between the empowerment of arresting bodies and the protection of
individual rights.72 By mirroring the constitutional framework in
their statutory schemes, states could be sure that they have pursued
a sound, well-reasoned approach to the issue of bounty hunter mis-
conduct. That is, while squarely addressing the tortious and criminal
behavior of a minority of bounty hunters, state codes would recognize
and respect the importance of fugitive recovery in our judicial system.
D. Mandatory Insurance
Legislation should also require that bounty hunters and bail
bondsmen obtain liability insurance. This would address two defi-
ciencies in the current state of the law.
First, it would ensure that successful plaintiffs obtain ade-
quate remedies for their injuries. Bounty hunters rarely make more
than $50,000 a year, and, therefore, are often unable to cover the civil
damages they generate. 7 3 Liability insurance would counteract (at
least nominally) this gap in accountability.
Second, insurance would help stabilize the economic security of
the bail bond industry. Bail bondsmens' economic viability is of criti-
cal importance to the criminal justice system. Without bondsmen,
bail becomes prohibitive to a large number of defendants, the Eighth
Amendment bar on excessive bail is implicated, jails swell, and poten-
tial innocents are forced to languish in custody.
Yet, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, bail bondsmen
may incur liability for the torts of their agents. Even one civil suit
arising out of a bounty hunter's misconduct would be sufficient to
drive a bail bondsman to insolvency.174 Moreover, given the recent
media coverage of bounty hunter misconduct,175 the political pressure
for reform,7 6 and the public's current hostility towards the bail bond
industry, 77 the number of claims brought against bail bondsmen is
likely to increase.
172. See, e.g., Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (balancing the need for
effective law enforcement against defendants' individual rights).
173. See Arizona to Rein in Bounty Hunters After Killing: Phoenix Raid that Went Terribly
Wrong, SING. STRArTs TImES, Sept. 8, 1997.
174. See, e.g., Purgavie, supra note 18, at 5 (describing a case in which a victim of bounty
hunter abuse recovered $1.15 million in damages).
175. See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf, Without Boundaries?, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 1997, at 4A
(addressing the Arizona incident).
176. See, e.g., Purgavie, supra note 18, at 5 (decribing a New Jersey Senator's push for
reform).
177. See, e.g., Bounty Hunters: A Wild West Tradition Worth Scrapping, supra note 139, at
10A (stating that bounty hunters have "wildly expansive rights"); Outlaw Bounty Hunters,
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Insurance mitigates the risk of insolvency in the bail bond
industry. Therefore, in order to preserve the integral role of bail
bondsman in our criminal justice system, both bondsmen and their
agents should be required to obtain coverage.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the incidence of abusive bounty hunting is, at worst,
infrequent, further regulation of the bail bond industry would stem
future misconduct. Care must be taken, however, not to overstep the
bounds of constitutional doctrine. If bounty hunting does not fall
squarely within the sphere of state action as a matter of sound
constitutional analysis, no measure of public policy validates saddling
the bail bond industry with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments.
In lieu of a constitutional approach, states should legislate to
control bounty hunting in accordance with local need. Licensing
requirements, mandatory insurance, and statutory provisions
preventing "unreasonable" searches and seizures are all advisable.
However, in no event is it appropriate to endanger the personal safety
of bounty hunters or the economic solvency of bail bondsmen.
Without them, bail skyrockets, innocents are forced to linger in
overcrowded jails, and the Eighth Amendment rights of defendants
are impinged.
Andrew DeForest Patrick*
supra note 14, at 16A (stating that Arizona "would do well to consider eliminating" bounty
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hunters as "Rambos" and demanding regulation of the bail bond industry).
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